Introduction
The independence and accountability of the judiciary operate as twin ideals, each meticulously protected by the Constitution. A judge may be removed from office only through the rigorous procedure of impeachment, determined by a conjoint reading of Article 124(4) of the Constitution and the Judges Inquiry Act, 1968 (the “Act”). In more than 75 years since India’s independence, no judge has been successfully impeached, and only a handful of impeachment proceedings have ever been initiated. The Act provides for a multi-layered mechanism for impeachment that purportedly functions to ensure that unmeritorious and politically-motivated claims do not succeed in tarnishing an office as revered as that of a judge. Upon the initiation of an impeachment motion in either of the Houses, the respective presiding officers are authorised to accept or rejection motions under Section 3(1) of the Act. Once a motion passes the admission stage, a Committee is constituted under Sections 3–5 of the Act which conducts a detailed investigation into the merits of the charges and delivers a verdict, which is finally put to vote in both Houses.
However, a closer reading of the history of impeachment proceedings reveals that the trajectory of such motions is frequently shaped by structural opacity and political complicity. Back in 2018, the rejection of the impeachment motion against J. Dipak Misra, then-CJI, by Chairman M. Venkaiah Naidu had ignited considerable debate over the structural efficacy of the Act, particularly concerning the role of the presiding officer in decisively admitting or rejecting motions of impeachment. More recently, the Speaker of the Lok Sabha accepted the impeachment motion against Justice Yashwant Varma of the Delhi High Court, leading to the formation of a three-member Committee. Amidst the inquiry, Justice Verma tendered his resignation on April 9, 2026, terming the process as “unconstitutional”.
These developments bring into sharper focus a larger question that remains unanswered: is the presiding officer’s act of admitting or rejecting a motion truly a “decision” grounded in statutory procedure, or does it assume the form of “discretion” shaped by procedural ambiguity and institutional insularity?
This article examines the statutory framework of the Act that defines the scope of the Speaker’s powers, using the 2018 rejection as a key reference point. It assesses the appropriateness of vesting such authority in the Speaker, particularly in light of the political nature of the office and the vagueness surrounding the limits on the exercise of power. The article stresses upon the imperative to introduce clearer procedural safeguards to ensure that the power to admit or reject impeachment motions is exercised legitimately and transparently.
Open-ended standards, closed-door decisions: Textual Ambiguity
Section 3(1) of the Act authorises the presiding officer to either admit or refuse a motion of impeachment after considering available material and consulting legal luminaries. On a plain reading, the statutory text reveals its ambiguities. Neither “available material” nor “legal luminaries” is defined under the Act. While the Supreme Court has clarified that “legal luminaries” may encompass judges of the Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and other eminent jurists, this does not, by itself, resolve the underlying issue of ambiguity. The Court’s guidance remains illustrative rather than binding, leaving the choice of who among these broad categories is consulted and what material is relied upon largely unfettered, and squarely within the presiding officer’s discretion. This gives rise to the potential of the impeachment process becoming a covert instrument for insulating favoured judges, while subjecting others to disproportionate and heightened scrutiny.
At the same time, the counter argument, that an excessively rigid definition of such terms may prove counterproductive, holds weight. It may be argued that such terms are left deliberately open-textured, reflecting what H.L.A. Hart would describe as the “open texture” of legal language. Over-specification through rule-making may cause relevant expertise or contextual sensitivity to be excluded. However, rejecting a strict definition does not necessarily mean an inherent lack of accountability. Despite the definition of constitutional terms such as “eminent jurists” under Article 124 being left similarly open-ended, the provision of institutional checks, such as multi-member decision-making within the collegium, mandatory consultation with constitutional authorities, and the possibility of reconsideration within the appointment process, collectively operate to minimise the risk of selective reliance. Thus, the issue is not that the presiding officer’s discretion exists, but that it operates in a low-visibility zone with negligible procedural safeguards.
Politics at the Threshold: Is the Speaker the Most Neutral Authority?
The Speaker was originally envisioned as a neutral authority, insulated from political considerations. However, within India’s predominantly partisan political framework, the Speaker is invariably affiliated to the ruling party. Even if not a member per se, the Speaker owes office to the ruling majority, given that the Speaker is elected by a simple majority of the Lok Sabha, which is ordinarily secured by the ruling party. When the Constituent Assembly was debating the process of judicial removal, several members had anticipated a similar risk of politicisation. Mr. Tajamul Husain had warned that if the majority party was against a particular judge, then “removal will become very easy”, while Mr. Kuladhar Chaliha had opined that due to pre-existing bias, “the guilty man may escape and the honest man be convicted.” These apprehensions reflect the continuing risk of impeachment becoming a tool which may be weaponised to foster a culture of political favouritism within the judiciary.
The link between J. Misra’s judicial record and the initiation of impeachment proceedings against him further highlights the tendency of political bias. J. Misra had delivered the judgment in the Judge Loya case, which came as a blow to the Congress-led opposition and faced widespread criticism. Coincidentally, it was the Congress and six other allied parties which rallied for J. Misra’s impeachment, with the motion ultimately being rejected by the Chairman. Regardless of the legal validity of the rejection, the optics are reflective of the potential for executive influence. Indeed, the Speaker was entrusted based on the constitutional expectation that they will act reasonably with a “high degree of responsibility”, but in the absence of well-defined limits on the scope of the Speaker’s discretion, there exists only limited statutory assurance against the possibility of extraneous considerations influencing the Speaker’s decision.
Thus, the existing framework reveals a structural imbalance: while it places significant importance on the Speaker’s constitutional expectation of neutrality, it fails to adequately supplement it with structured checks and balances to insulate the decision-making process from potential partisan influences. While judicial review is permissible against the Speaker’s decision, it operates as a last remedy for reviewing injustice on a case-to-case basis and cannot replace the need for clarity at the stage of decision-making itself. Thus, while political influence cannot be entirely eliminated given the nature of the Speaker’s office, the incorporation of procedural safeguards that promote transparency and accountability in decision-making is necessary to ensure that the process does not devolve into an opaque and arbitrary black box for selective scrutiny.
From Screening to Scrutiny: Expansion of the Prima Facie Threshold
The presiding officer’s role, at the admission stage, is limited to determining whether there exists a prima facie case for impeachment. Sections 3–5 of the Act exclusively grant investigative and evidentiary powers to the Committee constituted post-admission. The legislative debates around the Judges Inquiry Bill, when promulgated in 1964, reflect this understanding. The prima facie standard, however, does not refer to a purely formal or mechanical threshold, nor is it satisfied merely by the multiplicity of allegations. The set of claims, viewed holistically and not individually, must disclose a credible evidentiary basis for further investigation. Analogously, in criminal law, the standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt” requires that the evidentiary narrative, in its entirety, reaches a high degree of probability. Importantly, this does not entail a mini-trial on merits. Even in the first instance where a motion of impeachment was rejected in the proceedings against Justice J. Shah, the Speaker’s decision was based on the purely frivolous nature of the claims and the complete absence of any supporting material. Consequently, the Speaker’s role is fulfilled once the material collectively establishes a prime facie case warranting investigation, with any inquiry into the merits or veracity of the charges falling within the subsequent ambit of the Committee.
However, recent practice suggests a shift in the application of the prima facie standard. While rejecting the motion against Justice Misra, Chairman Naidu characterised the allegations as resting on “mere suspicion” and emphasised that even if taken at face value, they did not disclose “proved misbehaviour.” Relying upon Re v. Mehar Singh Saini, which emphasised the need for charges being “proven”, he concluded that the unsubstantiated nature of the allegations failed to meet the threshold of “proof beyond reasonable doubt”, and consequently, did not warrant further investigation. This is reflective of how “misbehaviour” under Articles 124(4) and 217 of the Constitution has been historically interpreted as denoting serious and grave misconduct rendering a judge unfit for office and is not established through mere errors in judicial or administrative decision-making.
This resembles the high evidentiary standards applicable to trial and far exceeds the requirements to be checked by the presiding officer at the admission stage. It is not practically or legally tenable to expect an initial Parliamentary petition to conclusively assert or prove the charges against a judge by itself. The Act exclusively empowers the Committee to assess the merits of the charges post the admission stage. The division of functions between the presiding officer and the Committee reflects a form of institutional specialisation grounded in the separation of powers, where the Parliament initiates the process but does not itself undertake evidentiary adjudication at the threshold stage. Extending this power to the Speaker will effectively amount to the exercise of quasi-judicial powers and introduce a two-stage adjudicatory process, inconsistent with both the intent and the purpose of the Act.
In this light, the petition against Justice Misra delineated five allegations against Justice Misra, with each allegation being supported by documents ordinarily sufficient to disclose a prima facie case for investigation by the Committee. However, the elevation of the threshold to the near-impossible standard of “being proven beyond reasonable proof” risks shutting the doors before any real scrutiny can begin. The concern, thus, is not that the threshold must be diluted, but that its contours must be carefully defined. An unduly rigid standard risks foreclosing legitimate inquiries into judicial misconduct, while an unstructured or overly permissive approach risks politicisation. The challenge lies in preserving the distinction between a credible case warranting investigation and a conclusive finding of misbehaviour, ensuring that the threshold functions as a gateway to scrutiny, rather than as a barrier to it.
Conclusion
The debate surrounding the presiding officer’s discretion in impeachment reveals a broader tension at the very heart of India’s constitutional design. While judicial independence demands strong insulation against political pressure, meaningful accountability requires that no constitutional authority resists accountability. With the ever-increasing concerns about the executive’s influence over the judiciary, it must be revaluated whether the legislature’s decision back in 1968 to vest such far-reaching discretion in a political office without adequate checks on the use of power is the most constitutionally-sound approach in contemporary times. What emerges is not merely a question of individual decisions, but of institutional design, one that enables opacity at a stage that decisively shapes whether scrutiny occurs at all.
Thus, any proposed reform need not dismantle the current framework but recalibrate it to ensure that the presiding officer’s role remains confined to that of a preliminary filter, not an adjudicatory gatekeeper. This requires a clearer articulation of the prima facie standard, coupled with procedural guardrails that anchor the exercise of discretion in reasoned and visible decision-making. Measures such as mandatory disclosure of the material relied upon, structured consultation processes, and the recording of reasons are imperative to counter the arbitrary manipulation of statutory thresholds. The true intent and object of the Act can only be realised if the Speaker’s decision operates as a neutral checkpoint before investigation, guided by statutory procedure and checked through a well-defined procedural mandate.
Author bio: Harshita Saraf is a 3rd year B.A. LL.B. student at the West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences, Kolkata. Her interests lie in constitutional law and international arbitration, and she is deeply involved in legal research, mooting, and alternate dispute resolution.
[Ed Note: This piece was edited by Tanvi Chhabra and published by Vedang Chouhan from the Student Editorial Team.]
