Even though the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu has rejected an unregulated pocket veto, constitutional design and comparative theory show that a regulated, time-bound pocket veto is not only legitimate but normatively desirable. A terminological clarification is necessary at the outset. In constitutional discourse, a “pocket veto” conventionally denotes a form of executive non-action that results in the lapse or effective nullification of a Bill. The argument advanced in this paper does not defend such final cancellation. Rather, it seeks to justify a regulated, time-bound form of executive non-action that operates as a pause within the legislative process. The concern here is therefore with temporal restraint, not veto power in the strict sense.
Democracies require deliberation, not mere speed. Executives far from being mere rubber stamps serve as the deliberative veto players who ensure that temporary legislative majorities do not rush through statutes that undermine constitutional values, federal balance and fundamental rights. Scholars like Bruce Ackerman emphasize the value of temporal separation and second look institutions in constitutional democracies. A structured pocket veto accompanied by reasons and judicial review preserves this deliberative function while preventing abuse. Thus, the problem is not delay itself, but unaccountable delay. A constitutionalized pocket veto can achieve the right balance.
Firstly, this piece sets out the constitutional framework governing executive assent under Articles 200 and 201, situating the Supreme Court’s recent decision in State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu within that scheme. Secondly, it turns to comparative constitutional materials to examine how limited, time-bound delays in executive action have been understood in other constitutional democracies, and whether such delays can serve deliberative purposes without undermining democratic accountability. Finally, the piece argues that while the Indian Constitution does not permit indefinite or unaccountable executive inaction, it leaves space for a more structured and principled understanding of temporal restraint within the broader commitments to federalism and institutional balance.
- Constitutional Architecture of Assent Under Articles 200 and 201
The question of whether a pocket veto can ever be constitutionally legitimate must begin with the basic structural design of the executive assent in India. Article 200 and Article 201 of the Constitution lay down the framework through which Bills passed by the State Legislatures reach legal fruition. At the outset, it is necessary to clarify that the argument advanced in this piece concerning regulated, time-bound executive delay applies not only to the Governor under Article 200, but also to the President when exercising assent powers under Article 201. The Constitution structures assent as a continuous deliberative process rather than as isolated silos of authority. Once a Bill is reserved, the President occupies the same functional position of constitutional scrutiny, albeit at a different institutional level.
Historically, these constitutional provisions were understood to create tripartite choice for the Governor under Article 200 wherein they could grant assent, withhold assent, or reserve the Bill for the consideration of the President. Article 201 then vests the President with the power to either grant or withhold assent to Bills reserved for consideration. At no point do the provisions explicitly authorize inaction. Yet, neither do they prescribe firm timelines or procedural constraints, leaving the question of delay, whether permissible or abusive, open to judicial interpretation.
This ambiguity became the basis of decades of constitutional controversy, culminating recently in the State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu, where the Supreme Court undertook a historical analysis of the assent provisions. The dispute arose from a prolonged confrontation between the Tamil Nadu Government and the Governor, whose refusal to act on the twelve Bills brought the legislative process of the State to a near standstill. As multiple reports document the Governor did not act on any of the twelve Bills from the time he assumed office in November 2021 until November 2023, prompting the State to invoke the Supreme Court’s extraordinary jurisdiction.
The Governor’s conduct during this period raised constitutional alarms. First, he withheld assent simpliciter to ten Bills without furnishing reasons. Second, even after the Bills were repassed by the Assembly without modification the governor reserved then for presidential consideration which was considered later by the Court as impermissible under the structure of Article 200. The dispute this brought into sharp focus a fundamental question: Can a Governor indefinitely delay or effectively veto, legislation through inaction?
The Court’s answer to this question was that the Constitution does not contemplate any form of “pocket” or “absolute” veto under Articles 200 or 201. The Court emphasized that the expression “shall declare” in Article 200 imposes a positive constitutional obligation on the Governor to adopt on the three available courses of action. Inaction is therefore not an option. Reading the phrase “as soon as possible” in the first proviso to Article 200, the Court held that the scheme necessarily imports a sense of expediency. This phrase, the Court reasoned, is incompatible with the idea of indefinite delay.
Yet, as will be argued in later parts of this article, the Court’s reasoning against indefinite delay does not foreclose the possibility of a structured, constitutionally regulated, time-bound form of executive delay. The constitutional architecture of Articles 200 and 201 is designed not only to facilitate legislative efficiency but also to preserve deliberation, federal coordination, and constitutional scrutiny. These purposes are precisely what a carefully designed pocket veto, one that is reasoned, reviewable, and temporally limited, may be capable of achieving.
- Comparative Constitutional Theory and the Legitimacy of Deliberative Delay
The constitutional legitimacy of a pocket veto cannot be assessed solely through the lens of the Indian text. Comparative constitutional theory reveals that temporal checks where there are intentional pauses built into the lawmaking process are a structural feature of many democracies. These checks are designed not to obstruct legislative authority but to discipline majoritarian excess, deepen democratic deliberation, and preserve constitutional values. Two strands of comparative material support this claim: (i) Bruce Ackerman’s theory of the deliberative executive; and (ii) the United States Supreme Court’s pocket veto jurisprudence.
- Bruce Ackerman’s Conception of the Executive as a Deliberative Check
Bruce Ackerman’s influential articulation of the “deliberative political life” provides a foundational theoretical justification for structured executive delay. In the New Separation of Powers, Ackerman argues that, in modern constitutional democracies, the executive is not merely an implementing arm but a second look institution that subjects the choices of transient legislative majorities to reflective scrutiny (Akerman, pg. 683). Unlike the traditional Madisonian conception of separated powers as coequal and competitive, Ackerman’s model impulses, ensuring that proposals receive critical reflection (Akerman, pg. 637). Ackerman specifically notes that the executive veto creates valuable opportunities for reconsideration and public contestation highlighting that delay serves democratic and not anti-democratic functions by enabling broader debate and preventing legislative error (Akerman, pg. 639).
Though his discussion addresses the U.S. presidential system, the normative logic that delay when transparent and accountable, enhances deliberation, applies equally to parliamentary systems. The Sarkaria Commission Report on Centre-State Relations supports Ackerman’s proposition as it states that the Governor should not be reduced to a mere mechanical transmitter of Bills. The office requires sufficient time for independent consideration and application of mind before assent is given. Additionally, the Punchhi Commission suggested that the assent function of the Governor serves as an opportunity for further constitutional examination of Bills passed by the State legislatures. Lastly, in the Constituent Assembly Debates, speech of Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar on Oct. 7, 1949, states that the Governor requires adequate time for considering the constitutional propriety of a measure and its relation to the federal structure. Even in the recent case pertaining to the Governor of Tamil Nadu, even while rejecting indefinite delay, the Court recognised that, the Governor must be allowed reasonable time to consider a Bill consistent with constitutional propriety.
- The United States Pocket Veto Jurisprudence: Delay as a Constitutional Safeguard
Before turning to United States pocket veto jurisprudence, it is necessary to clarify the basis on which such a comparison is undertaken. The powers enjoyed by the President of the United States differ markedly from those exercised by constitutional functionaries in India, particularly Governors and the President, who operate within a parliamentary framework and do not possess an express veto in the American sense. This article does not proceed on an assumption of institutional equivalence. Rather, the comparison is functional and normative, not structural.
Although the U.S. Constitution expressly recognizes the pocket veto through Article 1, Section 7, judicial interpretation has added substantive democratic justification for it. In the Pocket Veto Case, the Supreme Court upheld the President’s power to allow a bill to lapse through inaction when Congress adjourns, emphasising that the executive must be afforded “a reasonable opportunity for deliberation.” The Court further explained that without such a mechanism, Congress could effectively compel presidential approval by adjourning immediately after sending a bill. This would resultantly lead to an undermine the constitutional balance between the branches.
Subsequent decisions reinforce this rationale such as in the case of Wright v. United States, where the Court underscored that the veto process pocket or otherwise serves to protect the President from being forced into precipitous decisions. The foundational basis to these cases lies not in executive supremacy but safeguards political deliberation by ensuring that the executive is not reduced to a ministerial actor. The U.S. Courts, like Ackerman, treat the delay as a structural shield against legislative coercion.
III. Conclusion
The inquiry into the constitutionality of a pocket veto ultimately turns on how a constitutional system understands time as a component of democratic decision-making. The Indian Constitution, as interpreted in recent judicial decisions, requires the executive to remain engaged in the legislative process and forbids the tactical use of delay to negate the will of elected representatives. Yet the comparative material analysed here demonstrates that, in many constitutional democracies, measured postponement is not an aberration but an instrument through which the system guards against precipitous lawmaking.
Ackerman’s conception of the executive as a deliberative actor and the American court’s recognition both underscore a common democratic insight, that the legitimacy of lawmaking is partly a function of the deliberative conditions under which it occurs. When the legislative timetable becomes excessively compressed, or when majorities attempt to engineer timing to their advantage, carefully structured executive timing-powers can safeguard the integrity of the process. For India, the challenge is not to import the pocket veto in its American form, but to recognise the underlying constitutional value it represents, that executive assent should not be a mechanical gesture, nor should deliberation be sacrificed at the altar of speed.
Author Bio: The author, P. Sannidhi, is a third-year student of law at NALSAR University of Law. She holds a passion for comparative constitutional law and public law.
[Ed Note: This piece was edited by Harshitha Adari and Jeetendra Vishwakarma and published by Vedang Chouhan from the Student Editorial Team.]
