The Right to Information Act, 2005, with
its 31 sections and two schedules, is one of the outstanding legislations of
Indian Parliament.   In view of its
inherent potential to ensure accountability of the institutions of governance,
and enhance the level of participation of citizens in the administration, there
has been a natural tendency on the part of the Central Information Commission,
to interpret its provisions liberally.  
This has manifested in a number of pro-citizen rulings from the CIC and
the appellate courts leading to a greater degree of transparency over
decision-making of authorities, than what was possible earlier.

An expansive understanding of the
definition of ‘public authority’ under the Act has apparently helped the CIC to bring many quasi-public authorities and private entities
with substantial funding from the Government within the Act’s ambit.   As the Act requires the `public authorities’
to declare information about them suo motu, and to designate Public Information
Officers to answer queries from information-seekers, the definition and
interpretation of ‘public authorities’ determines the scope of the Act.

The CIC’s June 3 order bringing political
parties within the ambit of public authorities, no doubt, stems from its sound
objectives to make political parties, receiving substantial indirect funding
from the Government, accountable, and empower citizens to use the Act to ensure
it.  However, the legal reasoning adopted
in the order, is vulnerable and may not stand scrutiny in the appellate courts.

The crucial question is whether a political
party can be held as ‘public authority’ 
under Section 2(h) of the Act. 
This provision deserves to be reproduced verbatim: “public authority”
means any authority or body or institution of self-government established or
constituted,- (a) by or under the Constitution; (b) by any other law made by
Parliament; (c) by any other law made by State Legislature; (d) by notification
issued or order made by the appropriate Government, and includes any – (i) body
owned, controlled or substantially financed; (ii) non-Government Organisation
substantially financed, directly or indirectly by funds provided by the
appropriate Government.”

If one reads Section 2(h) carefully, there
can be no argument over its first four parts, that is, (a) to (d).  The problem arises only with regard to the
use of the expression “and includes any”, followed by (i) and (ii) under (d).

The CIC relies on the Delhi High Court’s
judgment delivered by Justice Ravindra Bhat in Indian Olympic Association v.Veeresh Malik and Others (January 7, 2010), wherein the Court has observed that
the expression ‘public authority’ has to be interpreted liberally and not
restrictively. 

In this judgment, the High Court has
conceded that a facial interpretation  of
Section 2(h) would indicate that even the bodies brought in by the extended
definition, that is, through the use of the words “and includes any” are to be
constituted under, or established  by a
notification, issued by the appropriate Government. 

The court then added as follows: “If,
indeed, such were the intention, sub clause (i) is a surplusage, since the body
would have to be one of self-government, substantially financed, and
constituted by a notification, issued by the appropriate government.  Secondly – perhaps more importantly, it would
be highly anomalous to expect a ‘non-government organisation’ to be constituted
or established by or under a notification issued by the Government.  These two internal indications actually have
the effect of extending the scope of the definition  “public authority”; it is, thus, not
necessary that the institutions falling under the inclusive part have to be
constituted, or established under a notification issued in that
regard….irrespsective of the constitution (i.e. it might not be under or by a
notification), if there was substantial financing, by the appropriate
government, and ownership or control, the body is deemed to be a public
authority.  This definition would
comprehend  societies, cooperative
societies, trusts and other institutions where there is control,
ownership,  (of the appropriate
government) or substantial financing. 
The second class, i.e., non-government organisation, by its description,
is such as cannot be “constituted” or “established” by or under a statute or
notification.” 

Note that in its list of what the
definition of ‘public authority’ would include, the High Court lastly mentions
“other institutions”.  Individual
political parties do not qualify to be called institutions; party system
does.  As party system cannot constitute
an independent entity, the question of considering it a public authority does
not arise.

The registration of political parties under
Section 29A of the  Representation of
People Act, 1951, refers to political parties before their registration, as “an
association or body of individual citizens calling itself a political
party”.  The implication here is that
once registered, they cease to become an association or body of individual
citizens, and become political parties, with certain unique rights and
responsibilities, which the R.P.A bestows on them. 

Therefore, there is an element of doubt
whether the “body” referred to in Section 2 (h) (i) includes or could include a
political party.    The principle of ‘surplasage’, used by the
High Court to give meaning to Section 2(h)(d)(i)  is a recognised rule of interpretation.  It requires that effort should be made to
give meaning to each and every word used by the Legislature.  The Legislature is deemed not to waste its
words or to say anything in vain and a construction which attributes redundancy
to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons.

But the rule cannot be invoked, as the CIC
has done, to interpret a provision, so as to include what the legislature did
not intend to include at the time of enactment. 
Otherwise, the courts may invite the criticism of wrongly resorting to
casus omissus, that is, a matter which should have been, but has not been
provided for in a statute cannot be supplied by courts, as to do so will be
legislation and not construction. 

The Supreme Court’s constitution Bench
reiterated this principle in a judgment on August 23, 2001 (Daddi Jagannathamv. Jammulu Ramulu): “Undoubtedly
if there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature, the
Court would not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency. The Court
could not add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there,
especially when the literal reading produces an intelligible result. The Court
cannot aid the legislature’s defective phrasing of an Act, or add and mend,
and, by construction, make up deficiencies which are there.”

The CIC, which acts as a Court while
deciding a matter before it, has not demonstrated that Parliament
unintentionally omitted to include political parties under Section 2(h)(d)(i);
instead, it has assumed that Parliament intended to include political parties
under the provision, without making a detailed inquiry into the intention of
Parliament at the time of law-making.

The RTI Bill, 2004 – which was the
precursor to the RTI Act, 2005 – defined “public authority” as any authority or
body constituted by the Constitution, Parliament, or notification/order by
Government.   The National Advisory
Council recommended to the Government that this definition  be modified to cover the States, Panchayati
Raj institutions, and other local bodies. 
The Parliamentary Standing Committee which considered the Bill had
accepted this recommendation, and this led to the Government’s redrafting the
definition as it is now found in the Act. 
There is no evidence to suggest that the redrafting of the definition
was prompted by the demand to include political parties within the ambit of the
Act. 

The debate in both the Houses of Parliament ( Lok Sabha & Rajya Sabha) on the Bill between May 10 and 12, 2005, also does not suggest that Members had
intended to include political parties within the expansive definition of public
authorities.  It is unlikely that
Parliament would have left it to the CIC to decide whether political parties
could be considered as public authorities under the RTI Act.  The Supreme Court has held in catena of cases
that if a statutory provision is open to more than one interpretation, the
Court has to choose the one which represents the true intention of the
Legislature.