In Part I, the article set out the background context, highlighting the tension between the maternity benefits and adoption frameworks. It then examined recent jurisprudence to establish that maternity leave is intended to cover child rearing, while also addressing counter-arguments that it is meant solely for the biological recovery of the mother or for the care of an infant.
Part II now turns to the constitutional challenge itself, examining Section 5(4) through the lens of Article 14 and the doctrine of arbitrariness.
Article 14 And The Arbitrary Classification
As clarified by the Supreme Court in the recent hearing of the PIL, the issue at hand revolves around the exclusionary nature of the three-month threshold. The constitutional challenge to Section 5(4) centers on the guarantee of equality under Article 14 of the Constitution. For a classification to survive judicial scrutiny, it must satisfy two tests: intelligible differentia and rational nexus.
Lack of intelligible differentia: The law distinguishes between mothers adopting children below three months and those adopting older children. However, this line lacks any substantive justification. If caregiving needs are recognised for infants, there is no reason they should disappear once a child crosses the arbitrary threshold of three months. Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India shows that classifications founded on unfounded social assumptions cannot be sustained.
Absence of rational nexus: The MBA’s objective is to ensure women are not disadvantaged at work due to caregiving responsibilities. By that logic, maternity support must be tied to the presence of caregiving obligations, not the child’s age. Attachment, adjustment, and emotional security remain vital beyond three months. The cutoff thus has no rational connection with the law’s stated purpose.
Manifest arbitrariness: The provision is also constitutionally infirm under the doctrine of manifest arbitrariness articulated in Shayara Bano v. Union of India. In this case, the Supreme Court held that a law is manifestly arbitrary if it is “excessive”, “disproportionate”, or lacking a clear determining principle. As established in the previous section, Section 5(4) suffers from these very defects and thus violates Article 14.
Reference to the international legal framework further emphasises the arbitrariness of this provision. Although India has extended maternity benefits to biological, adoptive and surrogate mothers, which brings the law broadly in line with the global standards, the rigid limitation on the adoptive mothers alone remains anomalous. Even though India is not a signatory to the ILO Maternity Protection Convention, 2000, it’s relevant to note how it treats adoptive and natural mothers. It mandates at least 14 weeks of maternity leave for all working mothers without making any distinction between biological and adoptive mothers or based on the age of the adopted child. This is the case with several countries as well, including the United States and Australia, which provide equal maternity benefits, at par with biological parents, to all adoptive parents without any such restriction.
Further, even in jurisdictions that impose an age threshold, such as Switzerland, which in 2022 introduced adoption leave for parents of a child up to four years old, the limit remains arguably practical. South Africa has also confronted this issue through constitutional litigation. Section 25B of its Basic Conditions of Employment Act had limited adoption leave to children under two years of age. On 3rd October 2025, the Constitutional Court struck down this cap as unconstitutional, holding that it amounted to unfair age-based discrimination. The Court observed, first, that older children may require greater parental support, and second, that denying leave in such cases could discourage their adoption. It left it to the legislature to determine a more appropriate threshold, if any. This showcases that what was unconstitutional was the unreasonableness of the two year limit, not the very concept of an age threshold itself.
By imposing an arbitrary age threshold of three months, India’s maternity law deviates from global practices and is violative of Article 14, treating an adopted child and the adoptive mother differently, without any logical basis.
Harmonising With Constitutional And International Obligations
There is inconsistency not only with constitutional equality but also with India’s obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. According to Article 6, states must ensure that children’s survival and development reach their fullest potential. Moreover, Article 20 recognises that adopted children have a right to special protection, and Article 21 provides that adopted children have a right to all legislative frameworks related to adoptions governed solely by their best interests.
By imposing maternity leave restrictions based on the age of a child, the law fails to take into account these children’s right to special protection and the requirement that states must only act in their best interest. Therefore, the law favours, or in effect treats, adopted children differently based on their ages, unfairly undermining equal protection. There is no conflicting municipal law; thus, India is obligated to interpret domestic legislation as harmoniously as possible with its international commitments.
Furthermore, the Directive Principles of State Policy are relevant here, as they articulate the constitutional obligations of the State. Article 39(f) mandates securing opportunities for children to develop in a healthy manner, and Article 45 requires the State to provide early childhood care and education. Rigid adherence to a maternity leave framework that restricts benefits to children under three months runs contrary not only to the constitutional mandate under Article 39(f) but also to India’s international obligations.
Towards A Purposive Interpretation
The MBA is a beneficial legislation designed to ensure women are not penalised in their careers for assuming caregiving responsibilities. Courts have consistently interpreted beneficial statutes purposively, to advance their objects rather than restrict them. Section 5(4) must therefore be read in a manner that aligns with the realities of adoption and caregiving.
The Supreme Court has two potential approaches. The first is to strike down the three-month restriction as unconstitutional, ensuring adoptive mothers receive benefits at par with biological mothers. In the same vein, the legislature could, as South Africa’s Constitutional Court did, be directed to reconsider whether an age threshold is necessary at all, and if so, to fix it at a more appropriate age with justified reasons. This would reflect global practice and affirm that caregiving, not childbirth, is the central concern of maternity laws.
Alternatively, the Court may prefer a more restrained approach by at least aligning the MBA with the Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules, 1972, which already allow adoptive mothers leave for children up to one year of age. This harmonisation would be consistent with existing service frameworks and better reflect the adoption process, where most children are adopted well beyond three months. This would also align with jurisprudence recognising the first year as critical for bonding and attachment. In the case of children with special needs, extending maternity benefits irrespective of age would be even more consistent with constitutional mandates of equality and dignity.
Either route would significantly correct the present imbalance, bringing Indian law in line with constitutional morality and international standards.
Conclusion
The three-month limit is a substantive restriction that denies a level of institutional support to adoptive mothers and creates biases against older and special needs children. In addition to being inconsistent with the timelines set out in adoption law, the provision ignores judicial recognition of caregiving as intrinsic to maternity benefits and fails the test set out in Article 14.
By interpreting the MBA purposively, the Supreme Court can ensure maternity benefits deal with the reality of adoption, protect adoptive mothers from discrimination in the workplace, and protect the best interests of children. Whether through striking the provision in full or conforming it to existing service rules, the Court will be sending a clear message that motherhood, in all of its forms, will be afforded equal dignity and protection under the law.
Bio: Arima Kaushal is a fourth-year and Shashyak Roy is a second-year student at West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences.
Ed Note: This piece was edited by Aditi Bhojnagarwala and published by Tamanna Yadav from the Student Editorial Team.
