Introduction
This panel examined the intersection of constitutional text, institutional practice, and judicial intervention, focusing specifically on the controversies surrounding the exercise of gubernatorial discretion in matters of legislative assent under Articles 200 and 201 of the Constitution. The discussion situated these disputes within broader questions of federalism, separation of powers, constitutional conventions, and judicial creativity in moments of institutional breakdown. Across the panel, the speakers collectively reflected on how the governor’s office has increasingly become a site of constitutional contestation, particularly where delays in assent are deployed as tools of political control. The panel was moderated by Ms. Pankhuri, who framed the discussion as an inquiry into how constitutional design interacts with political practice and whether judicial responses to such disputes strengthen or distort the constitutional framework. Mr. Lalith analyzed the constitutional architecture of gubernatorial assent and argued that recent judicial readings of Article 200 “stretch” the constitutional text beyond its ordinary meaning. Mr. Richardson Wilson offered an insider account of the litigation strategy in State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu, especially the use of Article 142 and the doctrine of deemed assent. Ms. Sumedha Sarkar critically examined the Presidential Reference on Articles 200–201 and argued that its lack of factual grounding undermines its precedential value. Mr. Manu Raj situated the controversy within the larger constitutional history of federalism and judicial review, while critiquing the advisory opinion as a setback to coherent constitutional jurisprudence.
Moderator Brief: Prof. Pankhuri Agarwal (Professor, BML Munjal University)
The moderator introduced the panel by foregrounding the federal tensions produced by gubernatorial delay in assent, noting that what may appear to be episodic disputes are in fact structural problems in constitutional design. She emphasized that once political conventions fail to discipline discretion, the governor’s power can become susceptible to central strategic deployment, thereby raising difficult questions about judicial intervention and constitutional fidelity.
Speaker 1: Mr. Lalith Panda (Specialist [Rights and Regulation], Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy)
Mr. Lalith opened the discussion by revisiting the constitutional scheme of Article 200, explaining that once a bill is passed by the state legislature, the governor has three textual options: assent, withhold assent, or reserve the bill for the President. The proviso further allows the governor to return the bill for reconsideration “as soon as possible”.
His principal argument was that the recent judicial interpretation of Article 200 in the courts has tortured the constitutional text by mandatorily linking the act of withholding assent with the obligation to return the bill. According to him, the ordinary reading of the text does not necessarily support this interpretation, and the courts have effectively stretched constitutional language to achieve institutional ends.
Mr. Lalith argued that the real problem lies not in textual ambiguity but in the collapse of constitutional conventions, which were originally meant to ensure that governors ordinarily act on ministerial advice. He drew on comparative constitutional practice, particularly the Canadian model, to suggest that many such disputes were intended to be resolved politically rather than judicially.
The present crisis, in his view, reflects a deeper failure of political conventions and mutual institutional trust. He suggested that because these shared political beliefs have failed, the judiciary is stepping in with “forensic management” of other branches, which is a violation of the separation of powers. He concluded by suggesting that courts should focus less on forensic management of the constitutional text and more on creating conditions under which healthy conventions may re-emerge.
Speaker 2: Mr. Richardson Wilson (Advocate, Madras High Court)
Mr. Richardson Wilson shifted the discussion from theory to litigation strategy, drawing from his involvement in State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu. He began by situating the office of governor historically as a colonial inheritance from British India, arguing that while it once served as a supervisory link in a unitary imperial framework, its role in a quasi-federal republic remains constitutionally awkward.
He then turned to the Tamil Nadu litigation, explaining that 11 university-related bills remained pending with the governor between 2020 and 2023, despite repeated legislative action. Once the matter reached the Supreme Court, the governor abruptly withheld assent, only for the legislature to repass the bills, after which the governor reserved them for presidential consideration—conduct that he described as an attempt to frustrate the judicial process.
The central litigation innovation, according to him, was the request that the Court invoke Article 142 to grant deemed assent, because a mere mandamus would have produced only a “paper decree,” especially given the governor’s immunity from contempt proceedings under Article 361.
He defended the Court’s use of creative constitutional remedies, arguing that where constitutional functionaries obstruct democratic governance, the judiciary must ensure that elected governments are not rendered helpless.
Speaker 3: Ms. Sumedha Sarkar (Advocate, Supreme Court of India)
Ms. Sumedha Sarkar focused on the Presidential Reference under Article 143 concerning Articles 200 and 201, offering a sharp critique of its methodology and consequences. Her principal submission was that the advisory opinion lacked factual grounding, which in turn severely undermines its ability to function as a meaningful precedent.
She argued that precedents derive value from the relationship between facts, issues, reasoning, and outcome, and the Presidential Reference disrupted this chain by attempting to clarify the law while deliberately ignoring the factual matrix that had produced the Tamil Nadu judgment. This omission, she argued, makes the opinion doctrinally unstable and practically confusing.
A major consequence of this abstraction, in her view, is the erosion of judicially manageable standards, especially regarding timelines. The Tamil Nadu judgment’s three-month benchmark had been developed in response to actual institutional abuse; by contrast, the Presidential Reference restored a vague “as soon as possible” standard without acknowledging the misuse that necessitated judicial intervention.
She characterized the Court’s reasoning in the Reference as “managing institutions” rather than creating creative legal solutions to resolve the underlying political crisis. She concluded that the advisory opinion, rather than clarifying the law, has muddied the waters for future judges, who may now struggle to reconcile a fact-sensitive judgment with a factless advisory opinion.
Speaker 4: Mr. Manuraj Shunmugasundaram (Founding Partner, Ganesan and Manuraj Legal LLP)
Mr. Manuraj located the debate within the broader trajectory of Indian federalism and constitutional morality. He began by challenging the widespread use of the term “veto” in the Indian context, arguing that Article 200 uses the word “withhold,” not veto, and that this power is constitutionally limited.
Drawing on the Constituent Assembly Debates, he highlighted that Dr. B.R. Ambedkar had specifically removed the phrase “in his discretion” from the draft provision, thereby making it clear that governors were not intended to exercise independent discretion in matters of assent.
He argued that Governors, who often lack legal training, were acting as a second High Court by judicially reviewing bills. He termed the practice of blocking bills for years a constitutional perversion that violated the principle of constitutional morality.
Mr. Manuraj’s broader concern was that the Presidential Reference represents a regression in constitutional jurisprudence, especially after decades of federal strengthening through decisions such as S.R. Bommai v. Union of India. He argued that the advisory opinion weakens judicial review precisely when stronger judicial intervention is needed to protect democratic accountability and state autonomy.
He ended by characterizing the present moment as a federal moment in India, warning that unless constitutional morality restrains the misuse of gubernatorial office, the constitutional design itself risks being perverted through administrative practice.
Edited by: Aditi Bhojnagarwala and Keerthi Sathvika Tammineedi
