Last week, in Hiralal Harsora v. Kusum Harsora, the Supreme Court held that Section 2(q) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 is unconstitutional to the extent that it defines “respondents” under the Act to only include “adult males” and the relatives of an aggrieved woman’s husband/domestic partner. In effect, the judgment included women and minors within the definition of respondents, such that cases can now be filed against them under the Act. In this post, I argue that women should be exempt from the definition, at least as against their marital relatives. This exemption is based on power differentials within the family – power differentials that structure the occurrence, the subjective experience, as well as the adjudicatory evaluation of domestic violence.
In this piece, the author argues that the deceased deserve a right to dignity and cautions against the dangers of AI-driven digital resurrections, which could reduce the dead to mere commodities. To...
In this piece, the author argues that the deceased deserve a right to dignity and cautions against the dangers of AI-driven digital resurrections, which could reduce the dead to mere commodities. To...
Blurb: This article maps the four statutory criteria central to the sex-consent matrix, which render consent peripheral while elevating social control and sexual obligation. Thereafter, it reads the...
Summary: A fortnightly feature inspired by I-CONnect’s weekly “What’s New in Public Law” feature that addresses the lacuna of a one-stop-shop public law newsletter in the Indian legal space. What’s...
Summary: In this piece, we continue the discussion on Prof. Nivedita Menon’s latest book, Secularism as Misdirection: Critical Thought from the Global South. The summary of the book by Prof...
Summary: In this piece, we continue the discussion on Prof. Nivedita Menon’s latest book, Secularism as Misdirection: Critical Thought from the Global South. The summary of the book by Prof...