Introduction
In recent years, administrative authorities across India have issued orders prohibiting the sale of meat during specific religious festivals, leading to debates about whether the state can legitimately curtail the freedom of trade of meat vendors to protect the sentiments of particular religious groups. In Madhya Pradesh, Chief Minister Mohan Yadav issued directives mandating the prohibition of meat consumption along the Narmada River. Similarly, Gujarat has witnessed recurrent meat prohibitions during Paryushan, with the Surat Municipal Corporation imposing an eight-day moratorium on animal slaughter in September 2021. In Uttar Pradesh, Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath prohibited meat sales in Prayagraj for Mahā Kumbh Mela 2025, citing ‘sentiments of the Sanatan community.’
Article 19(1)(g) guarantees all citizens the fundamental right to practice any profession or carry on any occupation, trade, or business. However, this right is subject to Article 19(6), which authorises the state to impose reasonable restrictions in the interests of the general public. Article 19(6) specifies three conditions that the state must satisfy in order to impose restrictions. First, they must be imposed by validly enacted law. Second, they must be reasonable, and third they must be in the ‘interests of the general public.’
In this blog, I argue that the state cannot restrict the freedom of trade of meat shop owners and butchers on the ground that such restriction is required to protect religious sentiments, as the phrase ‘interests of the general public’ under Article 19(6) does not include the sentiments of a particular group of people. I do so by first examining the meaning of the phrase and then seek to prove that the current judicial reasoning misses the mark, by conflating the reasonability of restrictions, and them being in the interests of the general public. The phrase is comprised of three distinct parts: ‘interests,’ ‘general,’ and ‘public’. When interpreted purposively and literally, this phrase is unable to sanction restrictions that are based on the subjective preferences of a section of people.
Interests Of The General Public Under Article 19(6)
A common thread that runs across the meat ban orders is that they seek to accommodate the religious sentiments of a particular group of people during a particular festival. Can these sentiments be the interests of the general public?
This section looks at both the literal and the purposive interpretation of the phrase to analyse its textual and contextual limits. It also examines its original intent to evaluate whether religious sentiments alone can be the reason for restrictions under 19(6). This section aims to put forward the stance that should have been taken by the courts in deciding whether meat bans are constitutional.
Literal Interpretation of the Phrase
A literal interpretation requires examining the ordinary dictionary meaning of each term. The word ‘interest’ is defined as ‘the advantage or benefit of a person or group,’ suggesting objective welfare rather than subjective preferences. ‘Preferences‘ denotes immediate policy desires tied to campaign platforms and swayed by short-term passions. By contrast, ‘interests‘ refers to longer-term welfare or normative good of constituents. Interests may diverge sharply from momentary preferences and call upon representatives to deliberate and determine what will best serve enduring public well-being, even if it conflicts with fleeting popular sentiment. Hence, in the context of meat bans, the aversion of one section of a religion to meat cannot justify the prohibition on the sale of meat and operation of slaughterhouses throughout the territories. The interest of the general public must be construed to mean the normative good of the public at large and not the religious preferences of a sect or religion.
The word ‘public‘ refers to the community as a whole. The term ‘general’ is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as affecting or concerning all or most people, places, or things; widespread and not specialised or limited in range of subject, application, activity. The word ‘general’ serves as a qualifier that narrows the scope of ‘public,’ which denotes an emphasis on universality. Words of limitation in the Constitution must be given their full effect, as they represent deliberate constitutional choices. The words ‘general’ and ‘public’ function as limitations on the state’s power to selectively represent interests; rather, they impose a positive obligation on the state to consider the interests of society as a whole. Therefore, the literal interpretation conclusively demonstrates that religious preferences of specific communities, however deeply held, cannot qualify as ‘interests of the general public’ because they fail to meet the textual requirement of generality and universality as would be demanded by the plain meaning of the constitutional text.
Purposive Interpretation
Purposive interpretation examines the underlying objectives and broader purposes of constitutional provisions. The restriction clause in Article 19(6) exists not to prioritise certain sectional preferences but to balance individual economic freedom with collective benefits. Constitutional provisions must be interpreted to advance the constitutional purpose, not to stifle it. The conscious choice to use ‘interests of the general public’ rather than alternatives like ‘public interest’ must be considered. As an exception to the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g), it is subject to the well-established principle that exceptions to fundamental rights warrant strict and narrow construction.
The Supreme Court has consistently held that any provision that curtails fundamental freedoms must be read restrictively to preserve the primacy and efficacy of the guaranteed right. Therefore, the position of Article 19(6) as a qualified limitation on a freedom means that the judiciary must apply caution to its expansive application. The original meaning was never to include sectarian interests. The sub-committee on fundamental rights used ‘public interest’ rather than ‘general public interest,’ which drew critique from Thakur Das Bhargava and H.V. Kamath.
Public interests may be sectional interests, but general public interest denotes the interests of the whole. The debates clearly indicate that the framers intended ‘interests of the general public’ to have a broader, more inclusive meaning than ‘public interest,’ explicitly rejecting sectarian interests. When purposively interpreted, meat bans predicated solely on religious sentiments cannot be justified as serving the constitutional purpose embodied in Article 19(6). However, the courts have taken a different stance by completely abandoning this analysis of the meaning of the phrase, when it comes to deciding the validity of meat bans, instead using vague religious and historical examples to justify the bans.
The Current Judicial Discourse
This section examines the stance of the Supreme Court, through three cases:; Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v. Jan Mohammed Usmanbhai which examined reasonability; Hinsa Virodhak Sangh v. Mirzapur Moti Kuresh Jamat which establishes the prevailing judicial reasoning and an earlier case, which I argue is the correct framework to decide meat ban cases, Mohd. Faruk v. State of Madhya Pradesh. While recent developments across various High Courts have continued to grapple with these issues they have not departed from the reasoning laid down in Hinsa Virodhak.
In Jan Mohammed, the corporation owned slaughterhouses and declared certain days as holidays coinciding with religious festivals. The Court held that the corporation had the ability to determine the holidays of employees in slaughterhouses. The seven-judge bench did not explicitly overrule Mohd. Faruk but examined multiple factors including public health, sanitation, and workers’ conditions. The reasoning was primarily based on workers’ safety and public sanitation, not sectarian aversion. Hinsa Virodhak wrongly applies this precedent, ignoring the peculiar facts of the case. The court in Jan Mohammed was concerned with a matter pertaining to slaughterhouses and employee holidays, not with a ban on selling of meat.
Hinsa Virodhak concerned a Gujarat municipal resolution prohibiting slaughterhouse operations during the nine-day Jain festival of Paryushan. The Court ruled that the restrictions were valid as they were only for 9 days. While citing Jan Mohammed, it departed from it by extending the decision to private meat shops and relying on religious and historical justifications. The Court’s reasoning is problematic since, the court justified restrictions based on duration, incorrectly suggesting validity depends on duration rather than aim. This conflates reasonableness with whether restrictions were imposed in the general public interest.
Furthermore, the Court’s extensive reliance on religious texts represents a profound compromise of secularism. By citing Sanskrit shlokas and Emperor Akbar’s voluntary dietary practices to justify mandatory restrictions, the Court inappropriately introduces theological justifications into secular reasoning. The Court could have relied on the framework set up in an earlier case, that of the Mohd. Faruk case which interpreted the phrase ‘in the interests of the general public’ to explicitly exclude mere susceptibilities and sentiments of a section of people. However, it adopted the reasoning of the Jan Mohammed which was clearly not applicable in this case.
This represents a misinterpretation of the phrase ‘in the interests of the general public,’ divorcing it of its ordinary meaning and structural and historical context. The judgement introduced religious and historical justifications instead of examining what ‘interests of the general public’ means. It created a troubling precedent using religious preferences as grounds for restricting fundamental rights.
The Bombay High Court has continued to engage with related issues, recently questioning Jain bodies over attempts to restrict meat advertisements, as doing so would be encroaching others rights. This suggests that the judiciary has started to tread with caution when extending religious accommodation beyond reasonable limits.
Similarly, the Supreme Court has demonstrated restraint in extending meat ban precedents. It refused to interfere with an order staying a ban announced by the Maharashtra government on the sale of meat in Mumbai for four days during Prayushan. However, these recent judicial observations, while noteworthy, have not altered the legal position established by Hinsa Virodhak they have only been general observations, while passing largely procedural orders. This reluctance to revisit the precedent set in Hinsa Virodhak has produced an interpretation of the provision that seems to sanction the very practices it explicitly sought to exclude.
Conclusion
This piece showcases gaps in judicial reasoning when courts decide whether meat ban orders are valid. These decisions reflect a misunderstanding of “in the interests of the general public.” When interpreted in light of its ordinary, historical meaning and purpose, the phrase was never meant to represent sensibilities of particular sects or religions but was specifically deployed to prevent such selective application.
The notion of Indian secularism may require accommodation, but this cannot take the form of state-imposed restrictions. Such restrictions run counter to constitutional morality by violating secularism principles. Restrictions aimed at respecting religious sentiments appear unconstitutional when tested against their inclusion within ‘the interests of the general public’.
This doctrinal confusion where the courts blur the lines between the three distinct criteria for imposing restrictions under Article 19(6), enables such unconstitutional measures to escape judicial scrutiny. There are also cases where authorities have resorted to oral directives and informal pressure to impose these restrictions and in such cases the courts must actively intervene to protect fundamental rights.
There may also be additional challenges to such restrictions, including arguments that they are manifestly arbitrary or violate dietary autonomy rights. However, the aim of this blog was only to provide an interpretation of the phrase “in the interests of the general public” through the example of meat bans imposed throughout the country.
