Chastity, Virginity, Marriageability, and Rape Sentencing

A guestpost by Mrinal Satish, Associate Professor, National Law University, Delhi.
The horrific gang rape incident in
Delhi has led to demands for amending the law to provide for more stringent
punishment for rape, including introducing the death penalty. Over the last few
days, there have been various debates about the advisability of making such
changes to the law. An issue that has not been highlighted in these debates is
the existing state of rape sentencing. Any attempt at law reform needs to include
an examination of this issue. In this piece, I provide a brief account of a few
problems plaguing the current rape sentencing regime in India. This is based on
my doctoral study at Yale Law School, in which I examined all rape cases
decided by all High Courts and the Supreme Court over the last twenty five
Section 376 of the Indian Penal
Code (I.P.C.) prescribes the punishment for rape. For non-aggravated forms of
rape, the minimum punishment is seven years imprisonment, and the maximum is
life imprisonment. The minimum punishment for aggravated rape (gang rape, rape
of a girl under the age of twelve, custodial rape) is ten years imprisonment,
and the maximum is life imprisonment as well. In both these circumstances,
courts have the discretion to sentence below the prescribed minimum term of
imprisonment, if they provide “adequate and special reasons” for so doing. The crucial
question is: how do courts determine the appropriate sentence to be imposed on an
offender? A basic understanding of the trial process is essential to understand
the procedure involved. The Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) divides the trial
into two distinct phases – the guilt determination phase and the sentencing
phase. In the guilt determination phase, the court either convicts or acquits
the offender on the basis of evidence presented in this regard. If the offender
is convicted, then the sentencing phase begins. In this phase of the trial, the
court considers evidence and arguments on factors relevant to the determination
of sentence. Ruling on the factors that a court should consider in deciding on sentence,
the Supreme Court has held that the nature of the offence; the presence of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances; the prior criminal record of the
offender; his age, professional, social, and educational background, amongst
others are relevant. Another important consideration is the theory of
punishment that should be followed – deterrence, rehabilitation, retribution,
etc. Since the I.P.C. does not provide guidance to courts on any of these
issues, except for prescribing maximum – and in some cases, as in rape –
minimum punishments, judges have the absolute discretion to determine the
sentence for each individual offender. Unlike some other countries, such as the
United States and England, India does not have sentencing guidelines, which provide
rules and principles for judges to follow while sentencing. These guidelines generally
list out factors that the court should (and should not) consider while
sentencing. The absence of such guidelines in India is one of the reasons for
the rampant disparity that exists in sentencing across crimes, including rape.
In fact, the Supreme Court has itself repeatedly acknowledged the existence of
disparity in its death penalty practice. It has observed that sentencing has
become “judge-centric,” instead of being based on principles. The same critique
applies equally to rape sentencing as well. However, the causes for disparity
in rape sentencing, as compared to capital sentencing or sentencing in other
crimes, are entirely different.
What makes rape sentencing
different from sentencing for other crimes? Unlike other offences, the crime of
rape carries its own baggage. Over the years, stereotypical and patriarchal
notions have developed with regard to women’s sexual behaviour. Most of these
notions are based on the assumption that the chastity and virginity of a woman are
her most important “assets.” Popular notions consider rape as a fate worse than
death since it robs women of these “virtues” and casts a stigma over victims
for the rest of their lives. In these imaginations, rape is not a crime against
a woman’s sexual autonomy or bodily integrity, but an irreparable loss to her
chastity, “modesty,” and social standing. A woman who has already “lost” her
chastity and modesty by having sexual relations before or outside of marriage, is
not considered to have suffered too much harm; and the perpetrator is therefore
not required to be punished too severely. In order to ensure that such
stereotypical notions relating to the sexual behaviour and sexual mores of
women are not considered in rape trials, the Indian Evidence Act was amended in
2003, prohibiting the defence from impeaching a rape victim’s testimony on the
basis of her past sexual history. Unfortunately, the amendment appears to have impacted
only the guilt determination phase of the trial, and not the sentencing phase. The
site of stereotyping has merely shifted from the guilt determination phase to
the sentencing phase of the trial, and stereotypes have an adverse impact on
rape sentencing. In cases where the woman’s behaviour does not adhere to stereotypical
constructs, the men who raped them end up getting lower sentences.
But, if the law prohibits past
sexual history from being considered, how does it continue to impact rape
sentencing? The answer to this is the nature of evidence required to prove
rape, and the manner in which such evidence finds its way into the trial. The
crucial fact that the prosecution has to prove in rape cases is the lack of the
woman’s consent to sexual intercourse. Unlike laws of various other countries,
Indian law does not require the prosecution to prove that the offender knew that the woman had not consented,
or intended to rape the woman. The
woman’s testimony that she had not consented to intercourse is sufficient. In
fact, the Supreme Court has consistently held that conviction can be based
solely on the testimony of the woman, and there is no need for any other
corroborating evidence. However, the court has to be satisfied that the woman’s
testimony is reliable, and she is in fact stating the truth. It is in the
determination of the reliability of the victim’s testimony that stereotypes
enter rape adjudication.
An important piece of evidence in
rape cases is the report of the medical examination of the rape victim. Medical
and forensic evidence enables the prosecution to show that penetration of the
vulva by the penis (a pre-requisite for the offence of rape) had in fact taken
place. Doctors are required to testify to this fact, as also the presence of
body fluids and injuries, if any. Note, however, that the law does not require ejaculation. The protocols
followed by doctors in examining rape victims across India go much beyond
determining whether penetration had occurred. They continue to make assessments
of the woman’s sexual history, and play a major role in advancing stereotypical
notions relating to women’s sexual mores, by providing a scientific veneer to
the process. This process includes the examination of the woman’s hymen and the
distensibility of her vagina. Whether the hymen is torn, and if so, if such
tears are old or new are noted. Doctors conduct the “two-finger test,”
ostensibly to determine whether penetration has occurred. This highly invasive
procedure involves the doctor inserting one, two, or more fingers into the
woman’s vagina to determine the elasticity of the orifice. If the doctor is
able to insert two or more fingers, it ostensibly indicates that the woman has
had prior intercourse. The rationale behind this “test” is that if two fingers
can pass through the vagina, a body of the size of an erect penis could have
passed through the orifice at an earlier point of time.
Let me provide a concrete example
of how the stereotypes find their way into the trial process through medical
examination. Assume that in examining an unmarried rape victim, the doctor notes
the presence of old tears on her hymen. The doctor also notes that she was able
to insert two or more fingers into the vagina of the victim. Although the
doctor does not expressly opine that the woman was sexually active, this
information is conveyed to the court by way of the medical report. My study
showed that in cases where the medical report indicated that the woman had been
sexually active before marriage, lower sentences were imposed on the offenders
who raped them. In contrast, in cases where the offender had raped a virgin,
the sentence was relatively higher. Thus, the sexual history of the victim had
an impact on the sentence imposed on the offender. Another factor related to
virginity is the perceived loss experienced
by an unmarried victim, in terms of her marriageability. The Supreme Court has
in a number of cases noted how rape adversely affects the chances of a woman
finding a suitable groom. In this context, the Court has even held that the
marital status of the woman can be a relevant factor in rape sentencing. It is
not surprising then that offenders who raped unmarried (and virginal) women got
higher sentences in contrast to men who raped married women. Further, courts
tend to impose lower sentences when a victim who was unmarried when the offence
was committed, gets married during the trial. Since the rape did not impact the
victim’s ability to get married, the harm caused by the offence is discounted. An
egregious example of this approach is the Supreme Court’s decision in Baldev Singh v. State of Punjab (2011), another
gang rape case that got a lot of media attention. One of the reasons that the Court
gave for reducing the sentence in this case was that the victim was now
The second stereotype that affects
rape sentencing is the perception that rape is a matter of shame for the
victim. The Supreme Court has in fact frequently observed that a woman
experiences a “deep sense of deathless shame” as a consequence of being raped. Combined
with the notion that a woman considers her chastity and virginity to be invaluable,
a myth has developed that on being inflicted with this “shameful” act, a woman
will necessarily physically resist her attacker, when sexually assaulted. Such
physical resistance, it is believed, leads to injuries on the woman’s body,
which then demonstrates that sex was not consensual. Note, however, that the
law does not require the woman to resist the attack. The presence of injuries
might corroborate lack of consent, but the absence of injuries should not imply consent. Although
courts do not appear to infer consent from absence of injuries, I found a
marked decrease in sentences in cases where no injuries were present on the
woman’s body. Hence, unfortunately, the notion that a woman should physically resist
rape makes its way into rape sentencing.
The third interesting finding of my
study was that courts consider acquaintance rape to be less traumatic than rape
by a stranger. Offenders who were in a romantic relationship with the women
they raped got lower sentences, compared to their counterparts who raped women
they did not know. In cases of statutory rape where the under-aged girl had
consented to intercourse, courts consistently imposed lower sentences on the
offenders, based on the understanding that the young woman had otherwise
“contributed” to the offence.
Law reform movements, as well as
policy-makers have not paid much attention to issues pertaining to stereotypes
surrounding rape sentencing. For justifiable reasons, their focus has been on
steps to ensure higher convictions in rape cases. In addition to these efforts,
there is need for reforms to rid rape sentencing of stereotypes. This would include:
first, changing the nature of medical evidence collected in rape cases. Protocols
for medical examination of rape victims should be modified, and corresponding
changes should be made to medical education syllabi. The second reform required
is the formulation of principles to be followed by judges while sentencing rape
offenders. Factors that should not be considered in sentencing rape offenders (such
as the victim’s sexual mores) should be listed. Currently, a large number of
rape offenders whose victims do not adhere to the stereotypical construct of a
rape victim get relatively lower sentences. Ensuring principled sentencing, one
that is in tune with our constitutional values, is a better guarantee for
justice to rape victims, rather than legislative steps providing for capital
punishment, chemical castration and the like.
Satish is an Associate Professor at the National Law University, Delhi. His
doctoral dissertation at Yale Law School examines the issue of rape sentencing
in India. He can be contacted at
[email protected])
Written by
Aparna Chandra
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  • SC's rape cases in 2012 show that steretypes continue to influence Judges at the conviction stage also.

  • As always, Mrinal, your research is rigorous and on point. I hope that your research circulates widely now that there is a broad public discussion occurring.

  • Excellent post. My question is whether a meaningful defense is at all possible if all these controversial bits of evidence are excluded. As a hypothetical, suppose that the accused knew the alleged victim and admits to being present with her at the time of the rape (or there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the possibility). He, on the other hand, insists it was consensual. Since her statement alone would be sufficient, burden of discrediting it (showing unreliability) would rest on the defendant. What possible evidence could he provide to refute the allegation of rape? Being present with her, he would have no alibi. In the absence of forensic evidence, it would be his word against hers; even if it is available, if the part about the lack of injuries is disregarded saying she might have given up resistance as futile, there is little else left. If she had a borderline personality and a history of manipulating her partners in past sexual liaisons, that too could not be introduced because it would go to her sexual character and would therefore have to be excluded. Without either witness testimony or the two finger test, it may not be possible to even establish whether she had sexual partners before. Thus it would appear that if all the criticism is acted upon, there may well be few realistic avenues open to an accused to obtain an acquittal (without of course finding others to lie with him and provide an alibi).

    I have seen a lot of unsubstantiated claims about the unreliability of the two finger test but are there are any studies showing what its sensitivity/specificity/PPV/NPV are? It would be worthwhile to find out what proportion of women in India really insert foreign objects into their vagina or perform the sort of vigorous exercise that could lead to hymenal rupture and yield false positives. Likewise, how frequent is it that women decide to "give in" and not show vaginal injuries? Is it not the lack of arousal (and thereby the absence of vaginal secretions) that contributes to internal injury as much if not more than the violence caused by physical resistance in which case injuries should still be apparent even if the woman did not actively resist? Any exclusion has to be based on proper studies rather than assertions by interested groups. Few tests are 100% reliable, so it is important to take them into account without considering them to be conclusive by themselves.

    As a more general rule, is it not a common practice to take into account impact of a crime on the victim in deciding the sentence? With respect to rape, it is quite possible, indeed likely, that virginity and prospect of marriage are paramount for many of these victims. If she is from an upper class urban setting where these factors have limited value, that makes the equation different. Do you know of any sentencing factors which are/are not of value from the standpoint of future deterrence?

  • Very informative and educative post. I felt this was carefully reasoned and explained the reasons for various claims without handwaving.

    It would be very informative to see some descriptive statistics. For example, a 2×2 table of the number of severe sentences handed out by whether the case was acquaintance rape. This could help quantify the extent of the problem, and could perhaps be the basis for additional research.

  • Thank you for the informative post.
    As a human being this is how I feel:
    We have to ignore:
    Clock — time at which the crime occurred
    Age — how long one has lived to develop these sadistic traits
    Histories — how many times the criminals have committed such acts or how many times the victim has had sex
    What must be born in mind is that this is a premeditated group act against an unwilling, helpless individual.
    Harkens back to formation of society and appropriate functioning of an ensemble of unrelated individuals.
    This is a crime against humanity and the sadists must be subject to the same depravity.
    Death by impalement in a cesspool of human excrement.
    I find no utility in academic or procedural discussions — as the act is disgusting and repulsive. I am personally offended and livid. I would let loose Dhammer on these llumps of rotten cells.

  • Apart from the technical definitions of what constitutes rape, are there any procedural definitions? As an example, a relative, who makes a woman trust her, enters into sexual relations with her not once or twice but continues it regularly over a twenty five year duration, through 17 years of marriage of that woman, inspite of he himself being married. Does this constitute rape? There have been protests that even if consensual, if the woman happens to be placed in a position where she is, for reasons of fear, social ostracisation, desire to protect certain people's reputation etc. consents to have sex with men, such an act has to be construed to be rape. In the above specific instance can a charge of rape be brought?

  • Certainly, attitudes that affect the determination phase must change, and the odious, unscientific and unreliable "two finger test" must be discarded.

    Contrary to Dilip Rao's rather disgusting position set forth above, information about the victim's previous sexual experience simply has no place in making a determination about whether violence has occurred in any given instance.

    While changing the protocols for medical examination of rape victims is important and necessary, and establishing principles for sentencing is certainly overdue by decades, surely most laws dating from over 150 years ago- which are not examined in detail in this post- need to be re-examined, updated and changed as well?

    If "courts have the discretion to sentence below the prescribed minimum term of imprisonment," then what is the point of setting a minimum term of imprisonment at all? Since only a superior court is empowered to determine whether the trial court established “adequate and special reasons” for sentencing below the limit, this provision obviously enables courts to delay and thereby deny justice. This effective loophole, and the lack of sentencing guidelines overall, smack of the skewed distribution of power typical of colonial rule. Castration and death sentences aside, here is a colonial law that must be changed!